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Abstract: This study investigates whether managers influence credit ratings via voluntary 
disclosures. I find that firms near a rating change have a higher incidence of a disclosure regarding 
product and business expansion plans. This finding is more evident for firms that are subject to 
lower proprietary costs of disclosures, which implies that managers do trade off both the benefits 
and costs of the disclosures. I find no evidence that firms close to a rating change selectively release 
good news or suppress bad news on product and business expansion. Overall, my results suggest 
that firms generally exhibit a credible commitment to maintaining disclosure transparency for a 
desired credit rating.  
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1.  Introduction 
Credit ratings are important for a firm due to their impact on stock and bond valuations and 
to the regulatory and contractual costs (benefits) associated with a credit rating change (Kisgen, 
2006). Thus, managers have an incentive to maintain or achieve a desired credit rating through 
influencing rating agencies’ perceptions about corporate creditworthiness. Existing literature 
shows that the costs (benefits) associated with a credit rating change affect managerial capital 
structure decisions (e.g., Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2007; Kisgen, 2009) and corporate financing 
choices (Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman, 2010), and that firms tend to adjust leverage to 
influence rating agencies’ decisions. However, leverage is not the only concern for rating agencies 
in determining a firm’s credit rating. The rating process also requires analysis of publicly disclosed 
corporate information that is associated with a firm’s creditworthiness (Standard & Poor’s, 2009).  
       The objective of this study is to investigate how managers take advantage of voluntary 
disclosures to fulfil their incentives for a desired credit rating. I address this issue by probing 
managers’ disclosure strategies that are in response to an impending credit rating change. In this 
study, firms close to a rating change are defined as those near a threshold credit category per 
Kisgen (2006).1 I focus on disclosures as to product and business expansion (hereafters, PBE) 
plans for two reasons. First, every firm has PBE plans and their announcements occur frequently 
in practice (Nichols, 2010); hence, the focus on PBE disclosures facilitates a large sample analysis. 
Second, PBE disclosures represent a typical form of voluntary disclosure that implies long-term 
streams of a firm’s future earnings. As a credit rating is meant to discriminate a firm’s credit risk 
on a long horizon (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Standard & Poor’s, 2009; Hovakimian, Kayhan, and 
Titman, 2010), PBE disclosures might substantially affect rating decisions.2 Furthermore, PBE 
                                                        
1  The precise definitions used for empirical analysis are described on pages 4-5.  
2 As stated by Standard & Poor’s rating agency, “credit ratings are meant to be forward-looking in measuring 
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plans are discussed, ascertained, and finalized internally by management and then released 
publicly. To ensure stability of credit ratings, rating agencies tend not to rely on uncertain corporate 
information in their credit analyses. Even if a firm releases its PBE plans privately to the rating 
agencies, the plans might not be factored into credit ratings until after the public announcements 
of those plans. Hence, it is likely that impending credit rating changes influence managers’ public 
disclosure strategies regarding PBE plans.  
Rating agencies rely critically on projected future cash flow to assess a firm’s ability to meet 
financial obligation. A decrease in information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders has 
positive effects on a firm’s future cash flow, thereby increasing a firm’s creditworthiness perceived 
by rating agencies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006). The positive effects lie 
along three dimensions. First, a decrease in information asymmetry mitigates agency risk faced by 
all external stakeholders. For example, low information asymmetry that facilitates the monitoring 
of management practices could curb opportunistic management behavior that decreases firm value 
and promote better managerial decision-making that increases firm value. Low information 
asymmetry is conducive to establishing or maintaining a robust supplier-customer relationship, 
helping a firm generate sustainably high profits. Second, low information asymmetry enables a 
firm to raise full capital as planned on a timely basis, so that the firm would not miss out on some 
promising investment opportunities to enlarge future profits. Third, a decrease in information 
asymmetry reduces outside investors’ estimation risk and thereby lowers a firm’s cost of capital 
(e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2012).   
Prior literature (e.g., Lev and Penman, 1990; Welker, 1995; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 
2011) shows that managers could voluntarily disclose value-relevant information to outsiders to 
                                                        
long-term credit risk and the time horizon extends as far as is analytically foreseeable” (Standard & Poor’s, 
2009). 
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reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Hence, voluntary disclosure is an 
instrument through which managers may influence credit ratings. PBE disclosure is such an 
instrument, in that it has implications for long-term streams of a firm’s future earnings and reduces 
information asymmetry. As rating agencies claim to have incorporated information transparency 
into the assessment of a firm’s creditworthiness, firms that wish for a desired credit rating would 
be more likely to disclose their PBE plans. These disclosures also reduce the uncertainty of whether 
a firm would follow through with its plans, thereby reduce rating agencies’ estimation risk in 
respect to a firm’s future cash flow, and in turn, increase a firm’s creditworthiness perceived by 
rating agencies.  
Rating agencies face widespread criticism for their failure to adjust for opportunistic 
corporate reporting (e.g., SEC, 2003). They generally do not conduct audits or due diligence 
reviews of client-provided information. So, managers with an incentive to pursue a desired credit 
rating might selectively disclose good news in the belief that rating agencies might not be able to 
undo and adjust for the selective good news disclosures. Rating agencies, should they fail to undo 
a firm’s selective good news disclosures, would perceive the firm as having high information 
transparency and low credit risk. However, a credit rating is maintained by a firm for long time, 
which constitutes a repeated game between managers and rating agencies. In repeated games, 
managers can benefit from building up a reputation for credible disclosures (Stocken, 2000; Beyer, 
Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). By contrast, if managers selectively release good news or 
suppress bad news, this might temporarily deceive rating agencies, but would be penalized for the 
cheating once it is detected. In the case of such detection, the firm would be perceived as lacking 
information transparency in spite of the incidence of the good news disclosures. Therefore, 
conditional on a manager’s decision to voluntarily disclose PBE plans, whether he/she would 
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selectively release good news or suppress bad news for a desired credit rating becomes an 
empirical question. I investigate this as an exploratory analysis. Following prior literature (e.g., 
Noe, 1999; Cheng and Lo, 2006; Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008; Ge and Lennox, 2011; 
Nichols, 2010), I measure the nature of disclosure news by the announcement returns over its 
three-day event window.  
The credit rating scale consists of ten broad rating categories (i.e., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, 
B, CCC, CC, C, D) which respectively represent ten different qualitative indicators for a firm’s 
credit risk (Standard & Poor’s, 2009). Each broad rating category from AA to CCC is further 
divided into three subcategories with a distinction of minus, middle, and plus specifications (e.g., 
BB+, BB, and BB-). Following Kisgen (2006), I use two constructs to identify firms that have 
differential incentives to maintain or achieve a desired credit rating. First, I allow for three rating 
statuses for each specific notch rating (e.g., BB+)3, that is, whether a firm is near a rating upgrade 
(downgrade) to a higher (lower) adjacent specific notch rating or not near any notch rating change. 
I rank firms by quintiles within each specific notch rating based on the credit-quality determinants. 
The top and bottom quintiles of firms within a specific credit rating are classified as near a notch 
rating change and hence are more likely to maintain or achieve a desired rating level than firms in 
the middle quintiles which are classified as not near a notch rating change. Second, I classify firms 
as near a broad rating change if their ratings are designated with a plus or minus notch within a 
broad rating and not near a broad rating change if the firms do not have a plus or minus notch 
within the broad rating. Due to regulatory and contractual factors related to a broad rating, the 
costs (benefits) associated with a broad rating change (e.g., BB+ to A-) are greater than the costs 
                                                        
3  A notch credit rating includes a minus or plus notch, if given. A notch rating change refers to a change in the 
rating of any kind, including both a rating change between two notch ratings within the same broad rating 
category (e.g., AA to AA+) and a rating change between two notch ratings across two adjacent broad rating 
categories (e.g., AA+ to AAA-). A broad rating change refers only to the latter.  
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(benefits) associated with a notch rating change within the same broad rating category (e.g., BB- 
to BB, or BB to BB+). Therefore, firms that have ratings at the top or bottom notch of a broad 
rating category (e.g., BB+, BB-) should, on average, have a stronger incentive to influence ratings 
than firms that have ratings in the middle of the broad rating category (e.g., BB).  
After controlling for a wide array of disclosure determinants, I find that firms near a credit 
rating change are more likely to release PBE plans. This result is more evident for firms that are 
subject to lower proprietary costs of disclosures.  This implies that managers tend to trade off both 
the benefits and costs of the PBE disclosures. I do not find that firms close to a rating change 
selectively release good news or withhold bad news on PBE information. Collectively, the results 
suggest that firms generally exhibit a credible commitment to maintaining disclosure transparency 
for a desired credit rating. I further find that an increase in PBE disclosures raises the probability 
of a credit-rating upgrade in subsequent periods, suggesting that rating agencies favor firms that 
commit to high disclosure transparency.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior literature investigates the 
impact of managerial incentives on corporate disclosures in the setting of equity offerings (Frankel, 
McNichols, and Wilson, 1995; Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Kim, 
2016), stock repurchases (Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008), management buyout offers 
(Hafzalla, 2009), stock-for-stock mergers (Ge and Lennox, 2011), stock and stock option grants 
(Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003), and insider trading (Bushman 
and Indjejikian, 1995; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Cheng and Lo, 2006; Rogers, 2008; Cheng, Luo, 
and Yue, 2013). Nevertheless, despite the importance of credit rating to a firm, little research 
attention has been paid to managers’ use of voluntary disclosures to influence credit ratings. This 
study fills this gap in the literature. Unlike the prior studies which find managerial incentives to 
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engage in false or misleading disclosures, I find no such evidence in the setting of impending credit 
rating changes.  
Second, this study is the first to establish the link between credit ratings and nonfinancial 
disclosures. Though nonfinancial disclosures of PBE plans occur frequently in practice, little is 
known on the determinants of these disclosures, especially the role of managerial incentives. This 
study fills this void and demonstrates the importance of credit rating in managerial choice of 
nonfinancial disclosures.  
Third, the existing credit rating literature focuses primarily on the determinants of credit 
rating as well as its informational role in the financial marketplace. In contrast, few studies shed 
light on how managerial incentives for a desired credit rating influence corporate decisions. This 
study contributes to this literature by providing the first evidence on how credit rating affects a 
firm’s voluntary disclosure behaviors. By showing how managers disclose corporate information 
to influence credit ratings, this study provides important implications for credit rating agencies as 
well as other market participants, who need to evaluate a firm’s credit quality and viability via 
corporate disclosures.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the research methodologies. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 6 conducts the supplemental analyses, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Why do managerial voluntary disclosures matter for credit ratings? 
Credit rating analyses typically take into account plenty of information publicly released by 
a firm. A firm can provide rating agencies with private information for reference. However, 
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publicly released information is of first-order importance to rating agencies in the evaluation of a 
firm’s credit quality for two reasons.  
First, rating agencies are not obliged to audit the accuracy or integrity of client-provided 
information. Nor are rating agencies prone to do so, since the verification of the information would 
incur increased costs to rating agencies, who only receive a given amount of rating fees from their 
clients as service revenues.4 In that case, the inherent credibility of client-provided information 
becomes vital for rating agencies in the rating process. Managers hold no legal liability for 
privately releasing false or misleading information to rating agencies. By contrast, publicly 
disclosed information is subject to oversights from both external stakeholders and legal authorities. 
In such a sense, the public disclosures are more convincing than the private communications (e.g., 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010).  
Second, publicly released corporate information could influence the expected value of a 
firm’s future cash flow through establishing and/or altering market expectations. The change in 
the expected future cash flow would then alter a rating agency’s assessed level of the firm’s 
creditworthiness. However, increasing information transparency to the public or affecting market 
expectations to increase the expected value of future cash flow cannot be achieved by privately 
communicating corporate information to rating agencies.  
Research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006; Yu, 2005) shows that credit 
rating agencies are concerned about the extent of information asymmetry between management 
and external stakeholders when evaluating a firm’s creditworthiness. The reasons are three-fold. 
                                                        
4 I inquired of Standard & Poor’s rating agency about this issue. The response is that “If our clients cheat (and 
as we are not auditors, nor insiders, we can be cheated, and have been), in the future these entities may see their 
access to funds more limited and/or expensive than otherwise. These entities have potentially large and 
anonymous stakeholders base from which the entities are subject to scrutiny. Still, we always try to have a 
healthy skeptical view over the client-provided information.” 
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First, information asymmetry increases agency risk faced by all external stakeholders, which 
decreases the expected value of future cash flow to a firm. The decrease in the projected cash flow 
then raises default risk, resulting in a lower credit rating for the firm. For instance, information 
asymmetry generates a moral hazard problem in which managers pursue their own interests 
through shirking, consumption of perquisites, overcompensation, or empire building. These self-
interested managerial behaviors would decrease the projected cash flow of a firm. A customer that 
has high information asymmetry with its supplier is often subject to more stringent sales credit 
terms from the supplier. The stringent credit terms impair the customer’s liquidity position and 
lower the efficiency of the customer’s operating activities, thereby reducing its future profits.  
Second, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders brings about adverse 
selection costs to a firm. The disclosure literature (e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983; 
Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen, 2010) provides strong support for the proposition that investors 
tend to equate no news with bad news. Absence of any disclosure induces investors to rationally 
infer that a firm’s asset value is low or of high risk (Grossman, 1981; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and 
Walther, 2010). The lack of information transparency hinders a firm from financing its investments 
and operations in a timely manner, resulting in loss of future profits.  
Third, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders induces uncertainty (i.e., the 
conditional variance of a firm’s expected future cash flow) (Merton, 1974) and information risk 
(Easley and O’Hara, 2004), which increase the probability of default (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper, 2005; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller, 2011). Less informed investors charge a higher 
risk premium for the information asymmetry, thereby raising the firm’s cost of capital (e.g., 
O’Hara, 2003; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Hughes, Liu, and Liu, 2007).  
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Voluntary disclosures could induce better credit ratings for a firm (Yu, 2005) due to the role 
disclosures play in reducing information asymmetry (Lennox and Park, 2006; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
and Yang, 2011). Therefore, managers have incentives to make use of voluntary disclosures to 
maintain or achieve a desired credit rating. In this study, I look at the public announcements of 
PBE plans. Product information disclosures are defined as disclosures of plans that relate to the 
introduction, change, improvement, or discontinuation of a company’s products or services. 
Business expansion plan disclosures relate to an increase in a firm’s current operations through 
internal growth, such as entering into new markets with existing products, opening a new branch, 
establishing a new division, increasing production capacity, or investing additional capital in the 
current business, but exclusive of growth by merger and acquisition.5  Appendix II provides 
examples of PBE plans. These corporate business plans are discussed, ascertained, and finalized 
internally, and then voluntarily announced through press releases or news outlets. In maintaining 
rating stability, rating agencies usually do not rely on uncertain corporate information in their 
credit risk assessments. Credit ratings are updated only when rating agencies are confident that 
observed changes in a firm’s risk profile are ascertained (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Hovakimian, 
Kayhan, and Titman, 2010). Hence, even if a firm conveys PBE plans to its rating agency in private, 
the rating agency would likely not factor such plans into the firm’s credit rating until after the 
public announcement of the plans. The discussion above leads to a hypothesis I maintain for this 
study, which is that credit ratings are related to voluntary disclosures of PBE plans. 
I focus on public disclosures, a particularly important channel which affects rating agencies’ 
perceptions about a firm’s creditworthiness. I do not claim that private communications do not 
matter to credit ratings. Rather, it is interesting to look at how private communications would 
                                                        
5 The definitions of the PBE disclosures follow Capital IQ, a division of Standard and Poor’s. 
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change in response to an impending credit rating change, because private information might 
complement public information in influencing rating agencies’ perceptions on corporate credit risk. 
But private communications are unobservable to outsiders, which remains a substantive challenge 
for academic research. I leave this issue as an avenue for future research. 
 
2.2. Development of hypothesis 1 
Nichols (2010) finds that voluntary disclosures of PBE plans trigger positive, three-day 
abnormal stock returns of 30-60 basis points on average, suggesting that these disclosures likely 
provide value-relevant good news to the public. PBE plans have strong implications for long-term 
streams of a firm’s future earnings and thus are incorporated into credit analyses by rating agencies. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, public release of PBE information could reduce information 
asymmetry between management and external stakeholders, thereby leading to a firm’s higher 
creditworthiness. Furthermore, since PBE plans are discussed and ascertained before released to 
the public, the disclosures reduce rating agencies’ uncertainty about a firm’s strategic planning; 
this decreases the rating agencies’ estimation risk with respect to the firm’s future cash flow, and 
in turn, increases the rating agencies’ perceived creditworthiness about the firm. Therefore, firms 
that wish for a desired credit rating should have an incentive to commit to disclosing their PBE 
information. The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the incidence of a disclosure as to PBE plans is higher for firms that have 
a stronger incentive to maintain or achieve a desired credit rating.  
It is usually too costly for a firm to keep its disclosures sticky. The proprietary costs of 
disclosures, for instance, may be high, which deters a firm from publicly releasing its PBE plans. 
So presumably, a firm would trade off both the benefits and costs of PBE disclosures. If the 
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proprietary costs exceed the benefits of maintaining or achieving a desired credit rating for a firm, 
the firm would not disclose its PBE plans. Therefore, I have the following supplemental hypothesis.  
H1a: The association between managerial incentive to maintain or achieve a desired credit 
rating and the incidence of a disclosure as to PBE plans, as hypothesized in H1, is more evident 
for firms that have lower proprietary costs of disclosure.  
 
2.3. Development of hypothesis 2 
The incidence of a corporate disclosure is a necessary condition for a firm to maintain 
information transparency with outsiders in that a firm with no corporate disclosure would be 
factually perceived by all the outsiders as lack of information transparency. However, the 
incidence of information disclosure by itself does not guarantee information transparency 
perceived by outsiders unless the information is disclosed completely (i.e., both good news and 
bad news are disclosed once received). Given managers’ ex ante pre-commitment to voluntary 
disclosure, they could commit to selectively releasing good news or suppressing bad news. On the 
one hand, if outsiders of interest are sophisticated enough to see through selective good news 
disclosures of a firm, they would still perceive the firm as having low information transparency 
despite the existence of the good news disclosures. In this scenario, the firm is prone to commit to 
full disclosures which involve not only good news but also bad news. On the other hand, if 
outsiders are unable to discern selective good news disclosures of a firm, they would regard the 
firm as having high information transparency. In this case, the firm would have an incentive to 
disclose its information selectively. Overall, whether a manager would disclose corporate 
information in a complete or selective fashion to fulfill his/her incentives depends on whether, in 
the manager’s mind, outsiders of interest can undo the selective disclosures, and hence is an open 
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question to us. I probe this empirical question in the setting where managers have an incentive to 
maintain or achieve a desired credit rating. 
Nondisclosure could occur either because information sender is not informed of any news or 
because the sender is attempting to conceal bad news (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988), making 
it relatively difficult for outsiders to unravel a firm’s bad news hoarding. In this regard, managers 
might withhold bad news. However, managers are responsible for the introduction, change, 
improvement, and discontinuation of products or services and for business expansion. Hence, 
managers are supposed to know about the PBE news whenever it comes up, and if so, subsequent 
revelation of bad news on PBE would imply that managers have withheld the bad news.  
Rating agencies deal with their clients repeatedly and frequently in the long run and are 
familiar with their clients’ financial, economic, and operational statuses. Rating agencies are 
arguably specialized and sophisticated in acquiring and processing corporate information (Kisgen, 
2006). Hence, rating agencies should be able to infer bad news withheld by managers. In this case, 
managers will not withhold bad news. Otherwise, their firm’s stocks will be discounted not only 
for the bad news, but also for the discovery of opportunistic withholding behaviors.  
Even if rating agencies fail to discover bad news hoarding in the short term, a firm cannot 
withhold bad news for long. There exists an upper limit where it becomes too costly or difficult 
for managers to withhold the bad news any longer (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009), but 
managers usually cannot anticipate when the upper limit point arrives (He, 2015). Once the tipping 
point is reached, all the stockpiled bad news will come out all at once, resulting in a sudden, drastic 
decline in stock price, which is termed a stock price crash.  Studies (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011) demonstrate that withholding 
bad news leads to a stock price crash. Once a stock price crash of a firm occurs, rating agencies 
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would realize that the firm has withheld bad news. As a result, the firm would be penalized by a 
credit rating downgrade to an even larger extent. Therefore, it is likely that a firm wishing for a 
desired credit rating would not selectively release good news or withhold bad news about their 
PBE plans. This leads to the second hypothesis formulated in a null form as follows. 
H2: The likelihood of a good news disclosure (relative to that of a bad news disclosure) of PBE 
plans does not differ between firms with an incentive to maintain or achieve a desired credit rating 
and firms lacking the incentive to do so, conditional on the firms delivering the disclosure.  
 The null hypothesis, H2, implies that firms with an incentive to maintain or achieve a desired 
credit rating do not selectively release good news or suppress bad news in their PBE plans. 
However, if firms that wish for a desired credit rating tend to selectively release good news or 
withhold bad news in their PBE disclosures, the likelihood of a good news disclosure (relative to 
that of a bad news disclosure) of these plans should be significantly higher for firms with an 
incentive to influence credit ratings than for firms lacking the incentive to do so. 
 
3. Data  
The empirical analysis is conducted based on data gathered primarily from four sources: 
I/B/E/S, Compustat, CRSP, and Capital IQ. I draw the PBE disclosure data from Capital IQ which 
maintains a team of over 600 analysts who collect and code key developments for all U.S. publicly 
listed firms. Capital IQ has data on a variety of key corporate developments, including corporate 
guidance, product announcements, and business expansion announcements. I restrict my focus to 
press releases to ensure that the announcements were initiated by firms. The announcements of 
PBE plans pertain to stand-alone disclosures that exclude other types of information disclosures. 
Due to the availability of the PBE disclosure data, I restrict my sample period to 2002-2009. Panels 
  14 
A and B of Table 1 report the distribution of the incidence of PBE disclosures by year and industry, 
respectively. Firms in the industry of computer equipment & services and of electronic equipment 
have the highest incidence of PBE disclosures.  
For firm credit ratings, I use the Standard & Poor’s long-term domestic issuer credit ratings 
reported by Compustat.6 Unlike bond-level credit ratings, firm-level credit ratings are maintained 
with a firm on a regular basis for a long term. So, the credit ratings in my sample are all “regular” 
ratings, not “ad hoc” ratings. Panel C of Table 1 shows the full sample distribution of credit ratings 
at the firm-quarter level. The majority of observations in the sample fall within the credit rating 
level from BB- to BBB+, with BBB level observations accounting for the highest percentage 
(12.77%). Panel D presents the distribution of credit ratings by year. The percentage of 
observations rated from A- to AAA relative to the percentage of observations rated from BBB+ to 
B- decreases over years. This suggests that rating agencies have become more conservative over 
time in the period of 2002-2009, which is consistent with Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014).  
 
4. Research design 
4.1. Measures of impending credit rating changes  
As argued by Kisgen (2006), given the costs (benefits) associated with a credit rating change, 
a firm near a rating downgrade has an incentive to maintain its existing rating while a firm near an 
upgrade has an incentive to obtain an upgrade to be pooled with firms in a higher rating category. 
Following Kisgen (2006), I use two constructs to measure managerial differential incentives to 
                                                        
6 Credit ratings issued by different rating agencies do not vary systematically across firms, and thus, a vast credit 
rating literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2007; Kisgen, 2009; 
Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov, 2009; Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2014) 
focuses on credit ratings issued by a particular rating agency. I follow this literature to focus on credit ratings 
issued by S&P credit rating agency. 
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maintain or achieve a desired credit rating. The first construct relates to the discrete costs (benefits) 
associated with a specific notch rating change. Three rating statuses are considered for each 
specific notch rating level of a firm (e.g., BBB+), that is, whether a firm is close to a change to an 
adjacent higher or lower specific notch rating (e.g., BBB+ to A- or BBB+ to BBB), or not near a 
notch rating change. Firms, ranked in the top (bottom) quintile within each specific notch rating 
based on the credit-quality determinants at the beginning of a fiscal quarter, are classified as near 
a notch rating upgrade (downgrade).7 The credit-quality determinants incorporate firm size, the 
ratio of debt to the market value of equity, the ratio of EBIT to total assets, and the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. I first estimate a pooled regression of credit rating on those credit-quality 
determinants. The credit rating is transformed into a numerical score using an ordinal scale that 
ranges from 1 for the lowest-rated firms (D) to 22 for the highest-rated firms (AAA). The 
regression results (not tabulated) reveal that the coefficients on each of the explanatory variables 
are in the predicted sign and are highly significant at the 1% level, and that the adjusted R2 equals 
48.60%. I then sort the observations into quintiles within each notch credit rating, based on the 
magnitude of the fitted value from the regression.8 Observations in the top (bottom) quintile are 
classified as near a notch rating upgrade (downgrade), while observations in the middle three 
quintiles are classified as the benchmark group which is regarded as not close to a notch rating 
change. Firms in the top and bottom quintiles should exhibit greater propensity to maintain or 
achieve a desired credit rating than firms in the middle quintiles.  
                                                        
7 I also check the robustness of this definition by specifying firms close to a notch rating change as the top and 
bottom thirds within a notch rating. Results remain qualitatively the same under this alternative specification.  
8 Following Kisgen (2006), I sort financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6499) and utilities firms (SIC codes 4000-
4999) separately since these firms are subject to different rating criteria (Standard and Poor’s, 2009). The 
approach of classifying an impending notch rating change for a firm is subject to errors-in-variables problem. 
However, since the magnitude of the fitted value is used to group firms into high and low quintiles and to create 
dummies based on the grouping, the errors-in-variables problem is mitigated (Kisgen, 2006). 
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         The second construct relates to the discrete costs (benefits) associated with a broad rating 
change. Firms whose credit ratings are designated with a plus (minus) notch are considered as 
being close to a broad rating upgrade (downgrade). Given a higher likelihood of being upgraded 
(downgraded) to an adjacent higher (lower) broad rating category for firms rated in the outer 
notches (e.g., BB+ (BB-)) than for firms rated in the middle notch (e.g., BB), the former should, 
on average, have a stronger incentive to maintain or achieve a desired credit rating than the latter.  
 
4.2. Multivariate tests of H1 
The following logit regression model is specified to test H1. 
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                      (1) 
occurn equals 1 if a firm has a PBE plan announcement during the fiscal quarter t+1 and 0 
otherwise. notchimpending (broadimpending) equals 1 if a firm is close to a notch (broad) rating 
change at the end of the fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise.  Decisions by managers to disclose PBE 
information are subject to proprietary costs of disclosures. Following Karuna (2007), I use three 
dimensions of product market competition, product substitutability (substi), market size (mktsize), 
and entry costs (entryco), as proxies for the proprietary costs. Disclosures of PBE plans increase a 
firm’s risk of leaking its relevant proprietary information to product market competitors. A firm 
that has lower product substitutability (substi), lower entry costs (entryco), or larger market size 
of competing products (mktsize) faces more intense industry-level product market competitions, 
and thus is subject to higher proprietary costs of disclosures (Huang, Jennings, and Yu, 2017). 
Thus, occurn should be positively associated with substi and entryco and negatively associated 
with mktsize.  
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Following prior research (e.g., Nichols, 2010), I control for other potential determinants of 
the incidence of a firm’s PBE disclosures: earnings surprise (surprise), book-to-market ratio (bm), 
firm size (size), capital expenditures (capitalexp), product market power (marketpower), selling, 
general & administrative expense (sga), research and development expense (rd), return on assets 
(roa), financial flexibility (flexibility), industry-level litigation risk (litigation), earnings volatility 
(earningsvol), financial leverage (debt), changes in future leverage (changedebt), and distance to 
investment-grade distinction (investmentspec). I include two other variables, abnormal trading 
volume (abtradvol) and abnormal stock returns (abret), to control for the impact of potential 
fundamental-related events on managerial voluntary disclosures. All the variables in model (1) are 
defined in Appendix I. If H1 holds, the coefficients on notchimpending and broadimpending 
should be significantly positive. 
H1a suggests that for firms that are subject to higher proprietary costs of disclosures, an 
impending credit rating change has less positive impact on the incidence of a PBE disclosure. I 
test H1a by forming two portfolios based on the sample median of the proxy for proprietary costs 
of disclosures (propri). propri is constructed by using factor analysis to extract a composite 
measure of product substitutability (substi), market size (mktsize), and entry costs (entryco), the 
proprietary-cost proxies used in Karuna (2007). High value of propri represents high proprietary 
costs of disclosures for a firm. I use model (1) to compare the impact of impending credit rating 
changes on the incidence of a PBE disclosure between the high propri portfolio and the low propri 
portfolio. 
 
4.3. Multivariate test of H2 
The following logit regression model is used to test H2. 
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gnewsnf equals 1 if the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the three-day [-1, 1] window 
surrounding a firm’s PBE plan announcement are positive at the fiscal quarter t+1 and 0 
otherwise. 9  The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using a market model with an 
estimation period of [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date.10  Existing literature well 
documents the conflict of interests between shareholders and bondholders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the case of the shareholder-debtholder 
conflict, business expansion might incorporate risky investments that increase the value of equity 
and decrease the value of outstanding debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, some business 
expansion, even if implying good news for shareholders, might not be good news as well for 
bondholders. To address this concern, I use another good news proxy which is constructed based 
on bond returns.11 In this respect, the dependent variable in model (2) equals 1 if buy-and-hold raw 
bond returns, adjusted by contemporaneous U.S. treasury returns, over three days centered on a 
firm’s PBE plan announcement are positive and 0 otherwise. The calculation of the treasury-
adjusted bond returns follows the procedure employed by Easton, Monahan, and Vasvari (2009).  
                                                        
9 The classification of news type for voluntary disclosures pertains to a subjective judgment on which reasonable 
researchers/practitioners hold different perspectives and could reasonably disagree to a substantive extent. 
Therefore, following Noe (1999), Cheng and Lo (2006), Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), Ge and Lennox 
(2011), and Nichols (2010), among others, I use stock market reactions to identify the news type of disclosures.  
10 I also apply OLS regression to model (2) using a continuous variable, car, as the dependent variable, where 
car measures the magnitude of disclosure news and equals the stock/bond CAR for PBE plan announcements. 
In the regression results (not tabulated), the coefficient on notchimpending (broadimpending) is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that confronted with an impending notch (broad) rating change, a firm does not 
manipulate the magnitude of the disclosure news either. 
11 Unlike stock trading, bond trading does not occur on most of the calendar dates in a year. So, the bond-CAR 
measure used in corporate event studies usually gives rise to an inordinate proportion of either type I errors (i.e., 
over-rejecting the null hypothesis of no abnormal bond returns) or type II errors (i.e., under-rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal bond returns). Therefore, I still reserve the stock-CAR measure as the good news 
proxy for the empirical tests of H2.  
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It is possible that the announcement returns used to capture the disclosure news also 
incorporate the risk-reducing effect of disclosures (i.e., reduction in information asymmetry due 
to the incidence of a disclosure). But this concern is minimal because the test of H2 is conditioned 
on firms that deliver a PBE disclosure over a fiscal quarter. Because all the sample observations 
are restricted to those that have PBE disclosures, the risk-reducing effect of disclosures would have 
been offset and eliminated in the regression analyses. The treatment variables are notchimpending 
and broadimpending, which are defined previously.  
Based on prior research (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Karuna, 2007; Nichols, 2010), I include the 
following control variables in model (2): product substitutability (substi), market size (mktsize), 
entry costs (entryco), earnings surprise (surprise), book-to-market ratio (bm), firm size (size), 
return on assets (roa), product market power (marketpower), financial leverage (debt), changes in 
future leverage (changedebt),  distance to investment-grade distinction (investmentspec), abnormal 
trading volume (abtradvol), abnormal stock returns (abret), and industry-level litigation risk 
(litigation).  These control variables might be potentially associated with the announcement effects 
of PBE disclosures. All the variables are defined in detail in Appendix I. If firms near a rating 
change do not selectively release good news or suppress bad news on PBE information, H2 holds 
and 1 would be statistically insignificant.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
        Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression analyses. 
The measures of gnewsnf are constructed based on the subsample of firms that have a PBE 
disclosure over a fiscal quarter, while the rest of the variables are measured based on the full 
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sample of rated firms. The mean value of the dichotomous variable, occurn, indicates that 22.01% 
of the full sample observations have at least one announcement of PBE plans. The mean value of 
gnewsnf measured by stock/bond CAR indicates that more than half of the announcements of PBE 
plans pertain to good news disclosures. This is in line with Nichols (2010) who finds that managers 
are more likely to convey good news in the announcements of PBE plans.   
 
5.2. Univariate results 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 3 tabulates the PBE disclosure characteristics for firms near a 
notch (broad) rating change versus firms not near a notch (broad) rating change. The incidence of 
a PBE disclosure for firms near a notch rating change amounts to 0.2936, which is significantly 
higher than the incidence of the disclosure for firms not near a notch rating change (i.e., 0.1645). 
The likelihood of a PBE disclosure is also significantly higher for firms close to a broad rating 
change (0.2438) than for firms not close to a broad rating change (0.1604). These results suggest 
that firms confronted with an impending rating change are more likely to deliver a PBE disclosure, 
which is consistent with H1. 
        When good news on PBE plans is measured based on its announcement effect in stock market, 
the probability of the good news disclosure is 0.5082 for firms near a notch rating change, 
compared to a lower likelihood of 0.5023 for firms not close to a notch rating change. But the 
mean difference is only 0.59% and statistically insignificant (t-stat.=0.54). Firms close to a broad 
rating change have a lower likelihood of releasing good news PBE disclosure than firms not close 
to a broad rating change (50.70% vs. 51.03%), but the mean difference amounts to only -0.0033 
and is statistically insignificant (t-stat.=-0.26). These results are consistent with H2 and remain 
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qualitatively the same when the disclosure news is measured using abnormal bond returns around 
the PBE plan announcements.  
 
5.3. Multivariate results for tests of H1 and H2 
        Table 4 presents the regression results for the tests of H1. The coefficients on notchimpending 
and broadimpending are significantly positive, suggesting that firms facing an impending rating 
change are more likely to deliver a PBE disclosure to increase information transparency. The 
marginal effect of d(prob.occurn)/d(notchimpending) (d(prob.occurn)/d(broadimpending)) is 6.20% 
(6.18%), suggesting that one unit increase in notchimpending (broadimpending) leads to an 
increase in the incidence of a PBE disclosure by 6.20 (6.18) percentage points. The positive impact 
of the impending rating change is still evident when the dependent variable is broken into the 
product-disclosure-only case and the business-expansion-disclosure-only case, respectively. 
Consistent with Karuna (2007), the proprietary-cost variables have statistically significant 
coefficients in the predicted sign, except substi.   
        Panel A of Table 5 reports the regression results for the tests of H1a. In Columns (1-2), the 
coefficient on notchimpending is significantly positive in the low-proprietary-cost (propri) 
portfolio (0.7392, p=0.010), but is not statistically significant in the high-propri portfolio (0.2734, 
p=0.225). The difference in the coefficient for notchimpending between the high- and low-propri 
portfolios is highly significant at the 1% level. This suggests that when a firm is subject to low 
proprietary costs of disclosures, impending notch rating changes have a more pronounced effect, 
statistically and economically, on managerial propensity to release PBE plans. Columns (3-4) 
show that the coefficient for broadimpending is significantly positive in the low-propri portfolio 
(0.8234, p=0.004), whereas the coefficient for broadimpending in the high-propri portfolio is not 
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statistically significant (0.2794, p= 0.139). This suggests that firms confronted with an impending 
broad rating change have an incentive to release PBE plans only when the firms are subject to low 
proprietary costs of the disclosures.  
        I also partition the sample into two portfolios based on the sample median of product 
substitutability (substi), market size (mktsize), and entry costs (entryco), respectively. Small 
magnitude of mktsize and large magnitude of substi and entryco denote low proprietary costs of 
PBE disclosures. Panels B, C, and D of Table 5 report the regression results based on the 
partitioned subsamples, where the intercepts and the regression coefficients for the control 
variables are omitted for brevity. Panel B shows that the coefficients for notchimpending and 
broadimpending are more positive, both statistically and economically, in the high-product-
substitutability (substi) portfolio than in the low-substi portfolio. Panel C presents a positive and 
significant coefficient on both notchimpending and broadimpending in the low-market-size 
(mktsize) portfolio, but an insignificant coefficient for notchimpending and broadimpending in the 
high-mktsize portfolio. In Panel D, both notchimpending and broadimpending take on a significant, 
positive coefficient in the high-entry-costs (entryco) portfolio, but a statistically insignificant 
coefficient in the low-entryco portfolio. Collectively, the results suggest that the positive, 
significant impact of impending credit rating changes on managers’ commitment to releasing PBE 
plans is evident only for firms that are subject to low proprietary costs of disclosures.  
An alternative explanation for the H1 results is that rating agencies delay making a credit 
rating change for a firm when anticipating its forthcoming disclosures of PBE plans. However, 
this point cannot explain the differential results in Table 5 for firms with high proprietary costs 
versus firms with low proprietary costs. Or rather, if the alternative explanation held, we should 
have observed in Table 5 the significant impact of impending credit rating changes on PBE 
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disclosures even for firms that are subject to high proprietary costs. Furthermore, the alternative 
explanation requires that rating agencies have the ability to accurately anticipate forward-looking 
disclosures of PBE plans. Unlike earnings announcements, disclosures of the PBE news are not 
scheduled and are released sporadically, so it is unclear whether rating agencies can have a good 
ability to foresee such news announcements. 
Table 6 reports the results for the tests of H2. The coefficients on both notchimpending and 
broadimpending are statistically insignificant, irrespective of whether the good news measure is 
based on abnormal stock returns or on abnormal bond returns around the PBE plan announcements. 
This indicates that firms do not selectively release good news or withhold bad news on PBE 
information during an impending rating change.12 This is probably because managers foresee a 
high likelihood of the subsequent discovery of bad news hoarding in the repeated game setting of 
impending credit rating changes. This result reconciles with Stocken’s (2000) analytical evidence 
that in repeated games, managers tend to disclose information credibly.  
If PBE disclosures are bundled with contemporaneous earnings announcements, the return-
based measures of PBE disclosure news may introduce bias into my earlier results. To address this 
concern, I regress gnewsnf on earnings surprise (i.e., reported EPS minus the median consensus 
analyst forecast of EPS issued within 90 days prior to the actual EPS announcement date) for those 
“bundled” PBE disclosure observations, and treat the residual as the market response to the PBE 
disclosure news only. If the residual is positive (negative), the PBE disclosure is classified as a 
good (bad) news disclosure. For the PBE disclosures made in conjunction with management 
earnings forecasts, I apply a similar procedure to distinguish the PBE-disclosure-related news from 
the forecast-related news. Specifically, I regress gnewsnf on earnings forecast news (i.e., managers’ 
                                                        
12 Inferences from the results for the tests of H2 remain unchanged if I use the top third or top quartile of abnormal 
stock/bond returns as the cutoff for the good news classification.  
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forecast of EPS minus the median consensus analyst forecast of EPS issued within 90 days prior 
to the management forecast date) to obtain the residual for the disclosure news classification. I 
obtain similar results and inferences for H2 when using these alternative news measures for PBE 
disclosures.13 
The tests of H2 are conditioned on management’s decisions to voluntarily disclose PBE plans. 
This might give rise to sample selection bias because observations which are near a credit rating 
change but do not have a PBE disclosure are omitted from the regression analyses. Hence, I 
conduct a multinomial logit regression for model (2) using the full sample, whereby the potential 
selection bias could be corrected (Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand, 2007). The inferences for 
H2 remain unchanged for the multinomial logit specification. I also employ a two-stage Heckman 
(1979) Inverse-Mills-ratio method to control for the potential sample selection bias. A logit model 
is used for the first-stage regression that is modeled by model (1). The Inverse Mills ratio estimated 
from the first-stage regression is then included in the second-stage regression, which is modeled 
by model (2), to control for the selectivity bias. The results for the coefficients on notchimpending 
and broadimpending (not tabulated) under the Heckman Inverse-Mills-ratio specification are 
qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 6.  
        In sum, the results suggest that firms close to a rating change credibly commit to maintaining 
disclosure transparency. The lack of managers’ incentives to selectively release good news or 
withhold bad news on PBE information is consistent with managers’ genuine intent of reducing 
                                                        
13  Alternatively, I remove those PBE plan announcements which occur within one day around earnings 
announcements or management earnings forecasts, and obtain almost identical results. Other types of 
nonfinancial disclosures occur far less frequently than management earnings forecasts. So, I assume that the 
other nonfinancial disclosures that coincide with PBE plan announcements account for an insignificant portion 
in my sample. I also assume that all the nonfinancial disclosures coincide with each other in a random manner. 
Under these two assumptions, the results for the tests of H2 won’t have been qualitatively affected even though 
I fail to eliminate other types of nonfinancial disclosures due to the data limit.  
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information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders for a desired credit rating. The information 
asymmetry, once reduced, would lead to rating agencies’ expectations about a firm’s higher 
creditworthiness.  
 
6. Supplemental tests 
6.1. Separate impending rating upgrades from impending rating downgrades 
        I separate the effect of impending credit rating upgrades on the incidence of a PBE disclosure 
from the effect of impending rating downgrades. To this end, I replace notchimpending 
(broadimpending) with splus and sminus (plus and minus) in model (1) and re-run the logit 
regression. splus (sminus) equals 1 if a firm is near a notch rating upgrade (downgrade) and 0 
otherwise. plus (minus) equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating is close to a broad rating upgrade 
(downgrade) and 0 otherwise.  
Table 7 reports the regression results. Both splus and plus have a positive, significant 
coefficient (0.6561 and 0.5759, p=0.007 and 0.010, respectively). The marginal effects for splus 
and plus amount to 0.0912 and 0.0776, respectively, indicating that the results are not only 
statistically significant but also economically significant. The coefficient on minus is also 
significantly positive, indicating that the positive effect of impending rating changes on managerial 
proclivity to release PBE plans holds for the impending broad rating downgrade case as well. 
Following the same separation procedure to rerun model (2) yields results consistent with H2 for 
firms near a rating upgrade and firms near a downgrade, respectively.  
        Rating agencies, who deal with their clients repeatedly in the long run, are specialized and 
sophisticated in processing corporate information and are likely able to unravel negative 
information withheld by clients. If a firm close to a rating downgrade withholds bad news, when 
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the bad news is discovered by rating agencies, or when the firm cannot withhold the bad news any 
longer, the firm will suffer from an even more severe rating downgrade. The greater rating 
downgrade stems from two forces. First, given the bad news, the firm is subject to the rating 
downgrade that it should have had earlier on. Second, the firm is penalized for withholding bad 
news (i.e., not being honest) earlier. This explains why managers do not withhold bad news during 
an impending rating downgrade. 
 
6.2. Control for firm-fixed effects  
There might be a time-invariant aspect of managerial voluntary disclosure decisions that is 
driven by some unobserved firm characteristics. To address this issue, I run firm-fixed-effects logit 
regression for model (1). The firm-fixed-effects regression results (not tabulated) indicate that the 
coefficients on notchimpending and broadimpending become statistically insignificant. However, 
such results need to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, similar to Kisgen (2006), 
my hypotheses pertain to a both time-series and cross-sectional prediction. But the firm-fixed-
effects test relies only on time-series variation in impending credit rating status to identify the 
relationship between impending credit rating changes and managerial voluntary disclosures. 
Furthermore, the within-firm variance of credit rating status is not sufficiently large, especially 
relative to the between-firm variance of credit rating status, which reduces the effectiveness of the 
fixed-effects tests.14 This is in line with Kisgen’s (2006) explanation for why his results regarding 
firms near a credit rating change issuing less debt relative to equity are not robust to controlling 
for fixed effects. Second, the firm-fixed-effects test automatically drops firm-quarter observations 
                                                        
14  Consistent with the assertion by Kisgen (2006), my untabulated results reveal that for the sample used for the 
multivariate test of H1, the average within-firm variance of notchimpending (broadimpending) amounts to 
0.4017 (0.4122), and is significantly smaller than the average between-firm variance of notchimpending 
(broadimpending) which is 0.4609 (0.4856).  
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that have no within-firm variation in the dependent variable. This would be more evident when the 
firm-fixed-effects test is applied to a logit regression model in which the dependent variable is 
binary. Using the firm-fixed-effects logit model, my sample used for the test of H1 drops by around 
80%, which significantly reduces the power of the tests.15 As documented by Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010), a firm-fixed-effects specification is unlikely to work in the disclosure context because 
time-series variation in disclosures is often small.  
Since the firm-fixed-effects logit regression model does not work effectively in controlling 
for firm-fixed effects in the tests of H1, I instead include the lagged incidence of PBE disclosures 
(lagoccurn) in model (1) to mitigate the firm-fixed-effects problem. lagoccurn is coded as 1 if a 
firm has a disclosure of PBE plans in the lagged fiscal quarter and 0 otherwise. Given the stickiness 
of PBE disclosures, lagoccurn should be positively related to occurn. As predicted, the regression 
results, reported in Columns (1-2) of Table 8, indicate that the coefficient on lagoccurn is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Still, the coefficients for notchimpending and 
broadimpending are statistically significant with the positive sign (0.2160 and 0.3430, p=0.044 
and 0.001, respectively). As an alternative approach to alleviate the firm-fixed-effects concern, I 
also include two-digit SIC-code industry dummies in model (1). Columns (3-4) of Table 8 report 
the results: the coefficients on notchimpending and broadimpending remain positive and 
statistically significant (0.3365 and 0.4957, p=0.037 and 0.001, respectively).  
In addition, I estimate firm-fixed-effects regression for model (2) to control for omitted time-
invariant, firm-specific factors that affect managerial propensity to selectively disclose good news 
or withhold bad news on PBE information. While the number of sample observations used in the 
                                                        
15 Based on the conceptual arguments for H1, time-series variation in credit rating status also explains the 
incidence of a PBE disclosure. So, the observations that lack within-firm variance in the incidence of a PBE 
disclosure should not be excluded but would have been dropped if the firm-fixed-effects logit regression is 
applied to model (1).  
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firm-fixed-effects test approximates that reported in Table 6, the regression results (not tabulated) 
indicate that the coefficients on notchimpending and broadimpending are statistically insignificant, 
which is consistent with H2. 
 
6.3. The role of increased PBE disclosures in the likelihood of a future credit rating upgrade  
        Prior studies (e.g., Yu, 2005) provide evidence that rating agencies incorporate disclosure 
transparency into the evaluation of a firm’s creditworthiness. PBE disclosures have strong 
implications for long-term streams of a firm’s future earnings and cash flow. Holding all else 
constant, the public release of PBE information should be effective in reducing information 
asymmetry between management and external stakeholders. The reduction in information 
asymmetry not only decreases agency risk faced by external stakeholders, but also facilitates 
external financing and promotes investment efficiency, thereby increasing the expected value of a 
firm’s future cash flow. In anticipation of the increase in the projected cash flow due to the 
disclosure transparency, rating agencies would revise upwards their assessed level of a firm’s 
creditworthiness, resulting in a higher likelihood of a rating upgrade for the firm. In this regard, if 
a firm commits to higher disclosure transparency by increasing disclosures of PBE information, 
ceteris paribus, the firm should be more likely to get its rating upgraded following the increase in 
the PBE disclosures. To test this prediction, I estimate the following ordered logit regression for 
all the rated firms over my sample period. 
        
1 0 1 2 3 4
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t t t t t
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                                              (3) 
Credit rating reported in Compustat pertains only to a firm’s rating status at the end of a fiscal 
quarter. Accordingly, Δrating is the difference between credit rating at the end of the fiscal quarter 
t+1 and rating at the end of the fiscal quarter t, which captures a rating change that occurs on any 
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date during the fiscal quarter t+1. Δfreq equals the PBE disclosure frequency for the fiscal quarter 
t minus the PBE disclosure frequency for the fiscal quarter t-1. Based on prior studies (e.g., Kisgen, 
2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006) and rating methodologies of Standard & 
Poor’s rating agency, we also include change in firm size (Δtasset), change in profitability (Δoi), 
change in financial leverage (Δdebt), and change in liabilities-to-assets ratio (Δlev) as the control 
variables in model (3). It is relatively difficult for a firm to obtain a rating upgrade if its existing 
rating level is high. So, I control for the credit rating level for the quarter t (rating). Abnormal 
trading volume (abtradvol) and abnormal stock returns (abret) are also included to control for the 
effect of potential fundamental-related events that might drive future changes in credit ratings.16 
All the control variables are defined in Appendix I. Further, I augment model (3) with car to 
control for the news content of PBE disclosures since it may also drive future credit rating changes. 
I measure car as the average of the three-day-window cumulative abnormal stock/bond returns for 
all the PBE plan announcements during the fiscal quarter t. car is coded as 0 if a firm does not 
have a PBE disclosure during the fiscal quarter t.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. The coefficient on Δfreq in Column (1) is 0.0475 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that a firm is more likely to get its rating 
upgraded in period t+1 if the firm increases its disclosures on PBE plans in period t. Columns (2-
3) tabulate the regression results for model (3) augmented by car. Both stock car and bond car 
take on a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that good news PBE disclosure in the 
quarter t raises the likelihood of a rating upgrade in the quarter t+1. However, the positive 
coefficient on Δfreq becomes less significant after controlling for stock car. This might be because 
car could also incorporate the beneficial effects of increased disclosures (i.e., the role of increased 
                                                        
16 Alternatively, I exclude firm-quarter observations that have an announcement of equity issuance, merger, 
acquisition, or repurchase over the fiscal quarter t. The results after the exclusion remain qualitatively unchanged.  
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disclosures in reducing information asymmetry) and thereby may partially subsume Δfreq in 
explaining Δrating. Results remain qualitatively the same if I expand the time horizon for rating 
revision to two-quarters, three-quarters, and one-year ahead, respectively. Lastly, it is important to 
note that the positive coefficient on car per se by no means tells whether selective disclosures of 
good news or suppression of bad news would have a favorable impact on a firm’s future credit 
rating. Thus, the results in Columns (2-3) of Table 9 have no contradiction with my earlier results 
for H2. 
 
7. Conclusion 
        Credit ratings are important to a firm due to their impact on stock and bond valuations, as 
well as to the regulatory and contractual costs (benefits) associated with a credit rating change 
(e.g., Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2009). Therefore, managers have an incentive to improve their credit 
ratings through influencing rating agencies’ perceptions about firm credit quality. Kisgen (2006) 
shows that firms near a credit rating change issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a 
change in ratings, suggesting that firms tend to adjust leverage to influence credit ratings. 
Nonetheless, in addition to a firm’s leverage, rating agencies rely on publicly disclosed corporate 
information to evaluate a firm’s creditworthiness (Standard & Poor’s, 2009). Compared to a 
change in leverage, which requires material transaction costs and long execution time (Kisgen, 
2006), an adjustment in voluntary disclosures could be easier. Thus, if managers care about credit 
ratings, they should also have an incentive to affect rating agencies’ perceptions through corporate 
disclosures.  
        This study is the first to provide evidence on how managerial incentives to influence credit 
ratings affect corporate voluntary disclosures. I categorize firms near a rating change as having a 
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higher incentive to improve credit ratings. My empirical findings suggest that firms tend to commit 
to credible information disclosures to affect rating agencies’ perceptions. In particular, firms near 
a credit rating change have a higher incidence of disclosing PBE plans. The impending rating 
change has a more salient, positive effect on managerial propensity to release PBE information 
when a firm is subject to low proprietary costs of disclosures. This implies that managers tend to 
trade off both the benefits and costs of disclosures. I find no evidence that facing an impending 
credit rating change, firms are more likely to selectively release good news or withhold bad news 
on PBE plans. The credible commitment to the voluntary disclosures reduces information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, thus leading to rating agencies’ expectations about a 
firm’s higher creditworthiness. Consistent with this view, my further analysis reveals that an 
increase in PBE disclosures results in a higher likelihood of a rating upgrade in the subsequent 
period.  
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Appendix I   Summary of variable definitions 
Dependent variables Definitions 
occurn 1 if a firm voluntarily makes a PBE disclosure during a fiscal quarter and 0 
otherwise. 
gnewsnf 1 if three-day [-1, 1] cumulative abnormal stock/bond returns around a firm’s PBE 
plan announcement are positive, and 0 if the cumulative abnormal returns are 
negative. The abnormal stock returns are calculated using market model with an 
estimation period of [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date for a firm. The 
abnormal bond returns are measured as buy-and-hold raw bond returns adjusted by 
the contemporaneous U.S. treasury returns over three days surrounding the firm’s 
PBE plan announcement. 
rating The change in credit rating level for a firm during a fiscal quarter. The rating level 
(rating) is transformed into conventional numerical scores using an ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 for the lowest rated firms (D) to 22 for the highest rated firms 
(AAA). 
  
Independent variables Definitions 
notchimpending 1 if a firm is near a notch credit rating change at the end of a fiscal quarter and 0 
otherwise. 
broadimpending 1 if a firm’s credit rating is near a broad credit rating change at the end of a fiscal 
quarter and 0 otherwise. 
splus 1 if a firm is near a notch rating upgrade at the end of a fiscal quarter and 0 
otherwise. 
sminus 1 if a firm is near a notch rating downgrade at the end of a fiscal quarter and 0 
otherwise. 
plus  1 if a firm’s credit rating is near a broad rating upgrade at the end of a fiscal quarter 
and 0 otherwise. 
minus 1 if a firm’s credit rating is near a broad rating downgrade at the end of a fiscal 
quarter and 0 otherwise. 
lagoccurn 1 if a firm voluntarily makes a PBE disclosure during a fiscal quarter, which 
precedes the quarter for which occurn is measured, and 0 otherwise. 
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s common equity at the end of 
a fiscal quarter. 
litigation  1 for firms in the biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-
3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961) industries 
and 0 otherwise. 
earningsvol The standard deviation of quarterly earnings over 12 quarters ending at the end of 
a fiscal quarter. 
bm The book value of common equity divided by the market value of the equity at the 
end of a fiscal quarter. 
debt Long-term debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of a fiscal quarter. 
changedebt Long-term debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of a fiscal quarter, 
minus long-term debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the 
previous fiscal quarter. 
sga Selling, general, and administrative expense, divided by income before 
extraordinary items, for a fiscal quarter. 
rd Research and development expense, divided by income before extraordinary items, 
for a fiscal quarter. 
flexibililty Short-term investments plus cash holdings, divided by total assets, at the end of a 
fiscal quarter. 
investmentspec Distance to the investment-grade credit rating distinction, which equals 10 for 
AAA, 9 for AA+, 8 for AA, 7 for AA-, 6 for A+, 5 for A, 4 for A-, 3 for BBB+, 2 
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for BBB, 1 for BBB- and BB+, 2 for BB, 3 for BB-, 4 for B+, 5 for B, 6 for B-, 7 
for CCC+, 8 for CCC, 9 for CCC-, 10 for CC, 11 for C. 
entryco The natural logarithm of the average gross PPE for all firms in a 4-digit SIC 
industry for a fiscal quarter weighted by each firm’s sales in the same industry (in 
millions of U.S. dollars). 
mktsize The natural logarithm of the sum of sales of all firms in a 4-digit SIC industry for 
a fiscal quarter (in millions of U.S. dollars). 
substi The sum of operating costs of all firms in a 4-digit SIC industry for a fiscal quarter, 
divided by the sum of sales for all firms in the same industry (in millions of U.S. 
dollars).  
capitalexp Capital expenditures divided by total assets for a fiscal quarter. 
marketpower A firm’s sales as a percentage of sales for all firms in the same two-digit SIC 
industry for a fiscal quarter.  
surprise EPS for the current quarter minus EPS for the same quarter in the previous year. 
roa Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets for a fiscal quarter. 
freq The frequency of voluntary disclosures of PBE plans over a fiscal quarter, minus 
the frequency of the voluntary disclosures over the previous fiscal quarter. 
tasset The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of a fiscal quarter minus the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the end of the same fiscal quarter in the previous year. 
oi Earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets at the end of a fiscal 
quarter, minus earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets at the end 
of the same fiscal quarter in the previous year. 
debt Long-term debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of a fiscal quarter, 
minus long-term debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the same 
fiscal quarter in the previous year. 
lev Total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of a fiscal quarter, minus total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the same fiscal quarter in the previous 
year. 
car The average of three-day window cumulative abnormal stock/bond returns for all 
the PBE disclosures voluntarily made by a firm during a fiscal quarter, and 0 if the 
firm does not voluntarily make a PBE disclosure during the fiscal quarter. 
abtradvol The difference between trading volume of the current fiscal quarter and trading 
volume of the previous fiscal quarter. The trading volume is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the average of dollar trading volume (i.e., the product of the 
closing price and the number of shares traded for a firm) over a fiscal quarter. 
abret The size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of a firm over a fiscal quarter, which equal 
the compounded raw returns minus the compounded equally-weighted returns of 
the same CRSP size decile and the same CRSP exchange index (NYSE/AMEX/ 
NASDAQ) that the firm belongs to. 
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Appendix II   Examples of product and business expansion disclosures 
 
1. An example of product information plan --- American Express Introduces New Online and 
Mobile Payment Security Services 
 
“New York, November 3, 2014---American Express today announced the launch of its American 
Express Token Service, a suite of solutions designed to enable its card-issuing partners, processors, 
acquirers and merchants to create a safer online and mobile payments environment for consumers. 
With American Express Token Service, traditional card account numbers are replaced with unique 
"tokens," which can then be used to complete payment transactions online, in a mobile app or in-store with 
a mobile Near Field Communication (NFC)-enabled device. By using tokens, merchants and digital wallet 
operators will no longer need to store consumers' sensitive payment account information in their 
systems. In addition, tokens can be assigned for use with a specific merchant, transaction type or payment 
device to provide further protection against fraud. 
Based on EMVCo's Payment Tokenization Specification and Technical Framework published earlier 
this year, American Express Token Service offers the following features: (i) a token vault to store and map 
tokens to card account numbers; (ii) the ability to issue tokens; (iii) lifecycle management services to create, 
suspend, resume or delete tokens; (iv) additional fraud and risk management services, such as authorization 
and payment data validation capabilities, for card-issuing financial institutions. 
American Express Token Service is available in the U.S., and international rollout is expected to begin 
in 2015. 
“We believe our payments network is a tremendous asset to American Express – one that will allow us 
to offer our customers new features and technologies to meet their evolving spending needs," said Paul 
Fabara, President, Global Banking and Global Network Business, American Express.  "As we move ahead, 
we are excited to bring these new capabilities to our customers and look forward to continuing to serve 
them." 
American Express also announced that it has developed network specifications for Host Card 
Emulation (HCE).  American Express' HCE specifications provide its card-issuing partners with additional 
security options and solutions for payments made with mobile NFC-enabled devices that support Android 
iOS KitKat. With HCE, card issuers use a secure cloud server to store their customers' card account details, 
which can be transmitted from the cloud server to an NFC-enabled mobile device and then to a Point-of-
Sale terminal in a fast, secure manner. American Express' HCE specifications are available today 
globally." 
 
(Source: Press release from American Express, available at 
http://about.americanexpress.com/news/pr/2014/amex-intros-online-mobile-payment-security.aspx) 
 
2. An example of business expansion plan --- Apple to Invest €1.7 Billion in New European Data 
Centres 
 
“CORK, Ireland---February 23, 2015---Apple today announced a €1.7 billion plan to build and 
operate two data centres in Europe, each powered by 100 percent renewable energy. The facilities, located 
in County Galway, Ireland, and Denmark’s central Jutland, will power Apple’s online services including 
the iTunes Store, App Store, iMessage, Maps and Siri for customers across Europe. 
“We are grateful for Apple’s continued success in Europe and proud that our investment supports 
communities across the continent,” said Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO. “This significant new investment 
represents Apple’s biggest project in Europe to date. We’re thrilled to be expanding our operations, 
creating hundreds of local jobs and introducing some of our most advanced green building designs yet." 
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Apple supports nearly 672,000 European jobs, including 530,000 jobs directly related to the 
development of iOS apps. Since the App Store’s debut in 2008, developers across Europe have earned more 
than €6.6 billion through the worldwide sale of apps. 
Apple now directly employs 18,300 people across 19 European countries and has added over 2,000 
jobs in the last 12 months alone. Last year, Apple spent more than €7.8 billion with European companies 
and suppliers helping build Apple products and support operations around the world. 
       Like all Apple data centres, the new facilities will run entirely on clean, renewable energy sources from 
day one. Apple will also work with local partners to develop additional renewable energy projects from 
wind or other sources to provide power in the future. These facilities will have the lowest environmental 
impact yet for an Apple data centre. 
 “We believe that innovation is about leaving the world better than we found it, and that the time for 
tackling climate change is now,” said Lisa Jackson, Apple’s vice president of Environmental Initiatives. 
“We’re excited to spur green industry growth in Ireland and Denmark and develop energy systems that 
take advantage of their strong wind resources. Our commitment to environmental responsibility is good for 
the planet, good for our business and good for the European economy." 
 The two data centres, each measuring 166,000 square metres, are expected to begin operations in 2017 
and include designs with additional benefits for their communities. For the project in Athenry, Ireland, 
Apple will recover land previously used for growing and harvesting non-native trees and restore native 
trees to Derrydonnell Forest. The project will also provide an outdoor education space for local schools, 
as well as a walking trail for the community. 
 In Viborg, Denmark, Apple will eliminate the need for additional generators by locating the data centre 
adjacent to one of Denmark’s largest electrical substations. The facility is also designed to capture excess 
heat from equipment inside the facility and conduct it into the district heating system to help warm homes 
in the neighbouring community. 
Apple designs Macs, the best personal computers in the world, along with OS X, iLife, iWork and 
professional software. Apple leads the digital music revolution with its iPods and iTunes online store. Apple 
has reinvented the mobile phone with its revolutionary iPhone and App Store, and is defining the future of 
mobile media and computing devices with iPad." 
 
(Source: Press release from Apple, available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/02/23Apple-to-
Invest-1-7-Billion-in-New-European-Data-Centres.html) 
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Table 1  
Distribution of credit ratings and the incidence of PBE disclosures 
 
Panel A reports the incidence of disclosures across different years. Panel B presents the incidence of disclosures based on 
industry membership (two-digit SIC code). The observations are at the firm-quarter level for the sample period of 2002-2009. 
Panel C presents the full sample distribution of credit ratings at the firm-quarter level. Panel D shows the yearly distribution of 
credit ratings at the firm-quarter level. The credit ratings pertain to the long-term firm-level credit ratings complied by Standard 
& Poor’s and reported on Compustat. The credit ratings range from AAA (the highest rating) to D (the lowest rating --- debt in 
payment default). 
 
Panel A: The incidence of PBE disclosures across years 
Year Incidence Number of observations 
2002 0.1239 5052 
2003 0.1398 5159 
2004 0.1948 5620 
2005 0.2218 5744 
2006 0.2363 5704 
2007 0.2787 5835 
2008 0.2809 5618 
2009 0.2709 5090 
 
Panel B: The incidence of PBE disclosures across two-digit SIC-code industries 
Industry (SIC) distribution Incidence Number of observations 
Oil and gas (13, 29) 0.0685 2672 
Food products (20) 0.2884 1290 
Paper and paper products (24–27) 0.0436 1630 
Chemical products (28) 0.2496 3434 
Manufacturing (30–34) 0.1558 1887 
Computer equipment and services (35, 73) 0.5254 5973 
Electronic equipment (36) 0.5660 3134 
Transportation (37, 39, 40–42, 44, 45) 0.1194 2780 
Scientific instruments (38) 0.4585 1880 
Communications (48) 0.1234 2601 
Electric, gas, and sanitary services (49) 0.0653 3249 
Durable goods (50) 0.1240 605 
Retail (53, 54, 56, 57, 59) 0.2001 1914 
Eating and drinking establishments (58) 0.1075 400 
Entertainment services (70, 78, 79) 0.0550 928 
Health (80) 0.0033 612 
Others 0.0766 8833 
 
Panel C: Frequency and percentage on the entire spectrum of credit ratings 
S&P Ratings Frequency Percentage (%) Cumulative percentage (%) 
AAA 553 0.84 0.84 
AA+ 234 0.36 1.20 
AA 911 1.39 2.58 
AA- 1583 2.41 4.99 
A+ 2809 4.27 9.26 
A 4629 7.04 16.30 
A- 4683 7.12 23.43 
BBB+ 6208 9.44 32.87 
BBB 8398 12.77 45.65 
BBB- 5870 8.93 54.57 
BB+ 3544 5.39 59.96 
BB 4778 7.27 67.23 
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BB- 6296 9.58 76.81 
B+ 6144 9.35 86.15 
B 4173 6.35 92.50 
B- 2385 3.63 96.13 
CCC+ 955 1.45 97.58 
CCC 558 0.85 98.43 
CCC- 152 0.23 98.66 
CC 203 0.31 98.97 
C 0 0 98.98 
D or SD 676 1.03 100 
Total 65742 100 100 
 
Panel D: Distribution of credit ratings across years 
Freq. of S&P Ratings 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AAA 84 79 76 68 68 68 63 47 
AA+ 46 33 28 25 28 29 23 22 
AA 108 101 106 105 104 151 131 105 
AA- 259 210 189 188 206 182 197 152 
A+ 488 429 365 355 337 304 282 249 
A 640 621 632 618 559 533 502 524 
A- 647 649 606 607 608 563 545 458 
BBB+ 823 754 798 827 797 764 739 706 
BBB 994 1096 1130 1045 1076 995 1007 1055 
BBB- 803 741 761 770 668 699 713 715 
BB+ 458 508 493 460 460 444 367 354 
BB 635 591 599 659 648 593 565 488 
BB- 727 805 843 873 827 806 767 648 
B+ 854 849 884 795 807 739 662 554 
B 460 494 542 488 495 577 579 538 
B- 255 234 294 285 311 292 323 391 
CCC+ 149 126 110 148 119 82 80 141 
CCC 94 105 90 50 41 33 36 109 
CCC- 48 40 18 5 9 8 9 15 
CC 50 44 21 11 5 11 17 44 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D or SD 168 160 88 52 38 28 41 101 
Total 8790 8669 8673 8434 8211 7901 7648 7416 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main tests. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. 
The measures of gnewsnf and car are constructed based on the subsample of firms that have a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans 
over a fiscal quarter, while the rest of the variable measures are based on the full rated sample. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix I. 
 
Variables Mean Std.dev. 25th Median 75th N 
Dependent variables       
occurn 0.2201 0.4143 0 0 0 43822 
gnewsnf (stock CAR)  0.5057 0.5000 0 1 1 8715 
gnewsnf (bond CAR) 0.5469 0.4978 0 1 1 5780 
car (stock) 0.0755 0.2728 -0.0001 0.0100 0.0767 8715 
car (bond) 0.0721 0.3907 -0.0250 0 0.0785 5780 
       
Independent variables       
notchimpending 0.4370 0.4952 0 0 1 43822 
broadimpending 0.6641 0.4723 0 1 1 42972 
entryco 7.6835 2.6799 6.4420 8.2646 9.5422 43822 
mktsize 9.3890 1.7108 8.2299 9.4768 10.5445 43822 
substi 1.0312 0.1925 0.9271 1.0467 1.1418 43822 
size                                    8.0751 1.9563 6.8527 7.9747 9.3037 43822 
changedebt -0.6047 21.2839 -0.0521 0 0.0392 43822 
investmentspec 3.5674 2.0743 2 3 5 43822 
rd 0.6684 31.2524 0 0 0.1627 43822 
flexibility  0.1025 0.1227 0.1412 0.0580 0.0199 43822 
sga 7.0777 373.949 2.3681 7.6355 17.7205 43822 
bm 1.6999 20.9630 0.2631 0.4588 0.7481 43822 
marketpower 0.0652 0.1416 0.0026 0.0102 0.0469 43822 
surprise 0.5644 0.4958 0 1 1 43822 
litigation  0.1879 0.3907 0 0 0 43822 
debt 2.5909 28.8003 0.1313 0.3653 0.8717 43822 
capitalexp 0.0310 0.0181 0.0071 0.0181 0.0390 43822 
earningsvol  113.725 436.592 6.4145 20.728 80.449 43822 
roa 0.0088 0.0411 0.0024 0.0105 0.0209 43822 
abtradvol 7.9672 7.7306 0 11.2146 15.4203 43822 
abret 6.1434 225.6043 -0.1046 0 0.1156 43822 
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Table 3  
Univariate tests 
 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics of the PBE disclosure characteristics, partitioned by notchimpending 
(broadimpending). notchimpending (broadimpending) equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating change and 0 otherwise. 
N1 (N0) in Panel A refers to the number of firm-quarter observations that are (are not) near a notch rating change. N1 (N0) in Panel 
B refers to the number of firm-quarter observations that are (are not) near a broad rating change. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix I. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. occurn is an indicator variable for whether a firm delivers a voluntary 
disclosure of PBE plans during a fiscal quarter. gnewsnf is an indicator variable for whether a firm releases good news on PBE 
plans over a fiscal quarter. The measure of occurn is based on the full sample while the rest of the variable measures are based on 
the subsample of firms that have a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans over a fiscal quarter. 
 
Panel A: Comparison of the PBE disclosure characteristics by notchimpending 
Variables  
notchimpending=1  notchimpending=0 Mean difference 
(t-stat.) Mean N1  Mean N0 
occurn 0.2936  18875  0.1645 24947  0.1291 (31.77)*** 
gnewsnf (stock CAR)  0.5082   5020  0.5023     3695    0.0059 (0.54) 
gnewsnf (bond CAR) 0.5518   3427  0.5397 2353    0.0121 (0.90) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of the PBE disclosure characteristics by broadimpending 
Variables  
broadimpending=1  broadimpending=0 Mean difference 
(t-stat.) Mean N1  Mean N0 
occurn 0.2438 28536  0.1604     14436 0.0834 (20.98)*** 
gnewsnf (stock CAR)  0.5070 6300  0.5103    2083  -0.0033 (-0.26) 
gnewsnf (bond CAR) 0.5451 4150  0.5610    1312  -0.0159 (-1.01) 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics of the PBE disclosure characteristics, partitioned by. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 4  
Multivariate tests of H1 
 
This table reports the logit regression results for the tests of H1. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The dependent 
variable is occurn, an indicator variable for whether a firm delivers a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans during the fiscal quarter 
t+1. The treatment variable, notchimpending (broadimpending), equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating change 
during the fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and quarter dummies are included in 
the regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Variables  Pred. sign        Dependent variable = occurn 
Intercept 
 
? 
 -6.7825 
(<0.001)*** 
      -7.3132 
     (<0.001)*** 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
           0.4782 
(0.012)** 
       
broadimpending                                     
 
+ 
  
 
      0.5236 
     (0.003)*** 
entryco 
 
+ 
 0.1437 
(0.025)** 
      0.1391 
     (0.033)** 
mktsize 
 
- 
 -0.2467 
          (0.002)*** 
      -0.2174 
     (0.005)*** 
substi 
 
+ 
 0.5152 
(0.381) 
      0.4005 
     (0.492) 
changedebt 
 
+ 
 -0.0049 
(0.758) 
      -0.0003 
     (0.981) 
rd 
 
+ 
 0.0009 
(0.490) 
      0.0009 
     (0.573) 
flexibility  
 
+ 
 4.1879 
(<0.001)*** 
      4.2786 
     (<0.001)*** 
roa 
 
? 
 -2.1405 
(0.069)* 
      -2.6082 
     (0.061)* 
sga 
 
+ 
 -0.00005 
(0.276) 
      -0.00003 
     (0.440) 
size                                    
 
+ 
 0.6122 
(<0.001)*** 
      0.6362 
     (<0.001)*** 
bm 
 
- 
 0.0047 
(0.369) 
      0.0030 
     (0.633) 
marketpower 
 
+ 
 0.4764 
(0.520) 
      0.6079 
     (0.432) 
surprise 
 
+ 
 -0.0147 
          (0.836) 
      0.0090 
     (0.900) 
litigation  
 
+ 
 0.7503 
(0.007)*** 
      0.7073 
     (0.012)** 
debt 
 
+ 
 -0.0139 
(0.516) 
      -0.0044 
     (0.734) 
capitalexp 
 
+ 
 1.7089 
(0.415) 
      1.9969 
     (0.340) 
earningsvol  
 
- 
 -0.0004 
(0.060)* 
      -0.0004 
     (0.039)** 
abtradvol 
 
? 
 -0.0177 
(<0.001)*** 
      -0.0177 
     (<0.001)*** 
abret 
 
? 
 0.0181 
(0.031)** 
      0.0186 
     (0.020)** 
investmentspec 
 
+ 
 0.1025 
(0.038)** 
      0.1181 
     (0.040)** 
Year & quarter dummies  ?  included        included 
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No. of observations    43822       42972 
Pseudo R2    0.3188       0.3125 
Marginal effects: 
d(prob.occurn)/d(notchimpending 
 or broadimpending) 
 
+ 
  
0.0620 
       
     0.0618 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 5  
Multivariate tests of H1a 
 
Panel A of this table presents the logit regression results for the tests of H1a, in which the sample is partitioned by proprietary costs 
of disclosures (propri). propri is constructed by using factor analysis to extract a composite measure of product substitutability, 
market size, and entry costs, the three proprietary-costs proxies used in Karuna (2007) and are defined in Appendix I. Panels B, C, 
and D report the logit regression results for the tests of H1a, in which firm-quarter observations are partitioned by product 
substitutability (substi), market size (mktsize), and entry cost (entryco), respectively. Observations are partitioned into two 
portfolios based on the sample median of propri, substi, mktsize, and entryco, respectively. The regression results are reported for 
the below- (above-) median portfolio. Low (high) propri and mktsize feature low (high) proprietary costs of disclosures, while high 
(low) substi and entryco feature low (high) proprietary costs of disclosures. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The 
dependent variable is occurn, an indicator variable for whether a firm delivers a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans over the fiscal 
quarter t+1. The treatment variable, notchimpending (broadimpending), equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating 
change over the fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise. The intercepts and the coefficients for the control variables in Panels B-D are 
omitted for brevity. The continuous moderator variables (i.e., propri, substi, mktsize, entryco), which are dichotomized for 
partitioning the samples, are retained as controls in the respective subsample regressions. All the variables are defined in Appendix 
I. Year and quarter dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Sample partitioned on propri 
Variables  Pred. 
sign 
 Dependent variable = occurn 
Low propri  High propri  Low propri  High propri 
Intercept 
 
? 
 -7.4323 
(<0.001)*** 
 -6.7608 
(<0.001)*** 
 -8.3606 
(<0.001)*** 
 -7.1797 
(<0.001)*** 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
 0.7392 
(0.010)*** 
 0.2734 
(0.225) 
    
broadimpending                                     
 
+ 
     0.8234 
(0.004)*** 
 0.2794 
(0.139) 
changedebt 
 
+ 
 -0.0152 
(0.512) 
 -0.0082 
(0.782) 
 -0.0052 
(0.789) 
 -0.0068 
(0.779) 
rd 
 
+ 
 0.0011 
(0.576) 
 0.0020 
(0.429) 
 0.0010 
(0.677) 
 0.0021 
(0.408) 
flexibility  
 
+ 
 4.7760 
(<0.001)*** 
 3.7570 
(<0.001)*** 
 4.7362 
(<0.001)*** 
 3.7444 
(<0.001)*** 
roa 
 
? 
 -0.2991   
(0.908) 
 -3.1451   
(0.012)** 
 -1.5683   
(0.537) 
 -3.3474 
(0.014)** 
sga 
 
+ 
 -0.00003 
(0.535) 
 -0.0001 
(0.135) 
 -7.35E-6 
(0.865) 
 -0.0001 
(0.126) 
propri 
 
- 
 0.0779 
(0.808) 
 -0.1949 
(0.398) 
 -0.1651 
(0.607) 
 -0.1525 
(0.507) 
size                                    
 
+ 
 0.5360 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.5983 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.5965 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.6242 
(<0.001)*** 
bm 
 
- 
 0.0022 
(0.916) 
 0.0051 
(0.273) 
 0.0045 
(0.819) 
 0.0033 
(0.570) 
marketpower 
 
+ 
 1.5949 
(0.341) 
 0.5880 
(0.483) 
 1.6748 
(0.312) 
 0.5560 
(0.519) 
debt 
 
+ 
 -0.0257   
(0.508) 
 -0.0361   
(0.376) 
 -0.0089   
(0.678) 
 -0.0134 
(0.610) 
surprise 
 
+ 
 -0.0109 
(0.922) 
 -0.0284 
(0.742) 
 0.0516 
(0.643) 
 -0.0355 
(0.682) 
capitalexp 
 
+ 
 4.9878 
(0.025)** 
 -2.5833 
(0.338) 
 5.5646 
(0.012)** 
 -3.1063 
(0.276) 
earningsvol 
 
- 
 -0.0006 
(0.064)* 
 0.0002 
(0.565) 
 -0.0008 
(0.005)*** 
 0.0003 
(0.460) 
litigation 
 
+ 
 1.0229 
(0.011)** 
 0.3892 
(0.234) 
 0.9759 
(0.018)** 
 0.4087 
(0.205) 
abtradvol 
 
? 
 -0.0221 
(<0.001)*** 
 -0.0116 
(0.003)*** 
 -0.0228 
(0.001)*** 
 -0.0113 
(0.005)*** 
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abret 
 
? 
 0.0157 
(0.005)*** 
 0.0628 
(0.062)* 
 0.0169 
(0.003)*** 
 0.0624 
(0.069)* 
investmentspec 
 
+ 
 0.1349 
(0.059)* 
 0.1046 
(0.090)* 
 0.1317 
(0.128) 
 0.1428 
(0.035)** 
year & quarter dummies    included  included  included  included 
           
Low propri (notchimpending/broadimpending) > High propri (notchimpending/broadimpending) 
χ2    59.61    69.94   
(p-value)    (<0.001)***    (<0.001)***   
           
No. of observations    21918  21904  21252  21720 
Pseudo R2    0.3453  0.2576  0.3392  0.2618 
 
Panel B: Sample partitioned on substi 
Variables   Pred. sign  Dependent variable = occurn 
Low substi  High substi  Low substi  High substi 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
 0.3531 
(0.105) 
 0.6746 
(0.018)** 
    
broadimpending                                     
 
+
     0.2768 
(0.200) 
 0.7294 
(0.005)*** 
           
Low substi (notchimpending/broadimpending) < High substi (notchimpending/broadimpending) 
χ2    29.38    50.55   
(p-value)    (<0.001)***    (<0.001)***   
           
No. of observations    22861  22749  22609  22132 
Pseudo R2    0.1799  0.4066  0.1844  0.3976 
 
Panel C: Sample partitioned on mktsize 
Variables  Pred. 
sign 
 Dependent variable = occurn 
Low mktsize  High mktsize  Low mktsize  High mktsize 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
 0.7893 
(0.008)*** 
 0.3657 
(0.095)* 
    
broadimpending                                     
 
+
     0.8669 
(0.006)*** 
 0.2215 
(0.256) 
           
Low mktsize (notchimpending/broadimpending) > High mktsize (notchimpending/broadimpending) 
χ2    50.10    99.44   
(p-value)    (<0.001)***    (<0.001)***   
           
No. of observations    22683  22623  21995  22444 
Pseudo R2    0.3408  0.3132  0.3272  0.3142 
 
Panel D: Sample partitioned on entryco 
Variables  Pred. 
sign 
 Dependent variable = occurn 
Low entryco  High entryco  Low entryco  High entryco 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
 -0.0667 
(0.735) 
 0.8684 
(0.001)*** 
    
broadimpending                                     
 
+
     0.1753 
(0.355) 
 0.8435 
(0.001)*** 
           
Low entryco (notchimpending/broadimpending) < High entryco (notchimpending/broadimpending) 
χ2    227.34    107.04   
(p-value)    (<0.001)***      (<0.001)***     
           
No. of observations    21813  22009  21632  21340 
Pseudo R2    0.2582  0.3255  0.2624  0.3160 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 6  
Multivariate tests of H2 
 
This table presents the logit regression results for the tests of H2. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The dependent 
variable is gnewsnf, an indicator variable for whether a firm releases good news on PBE plans over the fiscal quarter t+1. The 
treatment variable, notchimpending (broadimpending), equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating change during the 
fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and quarter dummies are included in the regression 
but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Variables  Pred. 
sign 
 Dependent variable = gnewsnf 
(1)stock CAR  (2)bond CAR  (3)stock CAR  (4)bond CAR 
Intercept 
 
? 
 0.5156 
(0.014)** 
 0.8340 
(0.021)** 
 0.4477 
(0.041)** 
 0.7075 
(0.056)* 
notchimpending             
 
? 
 0.0535 
(0.305) 
 0.0440 
(0.597) 
    
broadimpending                                     
 
?
     0.0388 
(0.427) 
 0.0012 
(0.990) 
entryco 
 
- 
 -0.0237 
(0.017)** 
 -6.06E-6 
(0.269) 
 -0.0280 
(0.008)*** 
 5.74E-6 
(0.271) 
mktsize 
 
+ 
 0.0007 
(0.971) 
 4.48E-7 
(0.751) 
 0.0078 
(0.710) 
 7.17E-7 
(0.594) 
substi 
 
- 
 -0.0085 
(0.941) 
 0.2500 
(0.289) 
 -0.0037 
(0.975) 
 0.2664 
(0.260) 
changedebt 
 
? 
 0.0162 
(0.406) 
 -0.0335 
(0.286) 
 0.0187 
(0.021)** 
 -0.0221 
(0.482) 
debt 
 
? 
 0.0035 
(0.833) 
 -0.0335 
(0.286) 
 -0.0012 
(0.955) 
 -0.0221 
(0.482) 
investmentspec 
 
? 
 -0.0066 
(0.583) 
 -0.1428 
(0.598) 
 -0.0018 
(0.308) 
 -0.1533 
(0.571) 
size                                    
 
- 
 -0.0227 
(0.133) 
 -0.0335 
(0.286) 
 -0.0223 
(0.158) 
 -0.0221 
(0.482) 
bm 
 
+ 
 0.0002 
(0.989) 
 -0.2014 
(0.021)** 
 0.0046 
(0.765) 
 -0.1755 
(0.041)** 
marketpower 
 
+ 
 0.1014 
(0.476) 
 -0.1428 
(0.598) 
 0.0811 
(0.582) 
 -0.1533 
(0.571) 
surprise 
 
+ 
 -0.0078 
(0.874) 
 0.1627 
(0.050)** 
 -0.0134 
(0.793) 
 0.1660 
(0.056)* 
roa 
 
- 
 0.1514 
(0.823) 
 -1.4443 
(0.197) 
 0.2345 
(0.724) 
 -1.9263 
(0.090)* 
abtradvol 
 
? 
 -0.0044 
(0.158) 
 2.77E-10 
(0.387) 
 -0.0035 
(0.272) 
 4.19E-10 
(0.237) 
abret 
 
? 
 -0.00002 
(0.840) 
 -0.0004 
(0.332) 
 -0.00003 
(0.805) 
 -0.0004 
(0.375) 
litigation 
 
- 
 -0.0186 
(0.728) 
 0.0434 
(0.645) 
 -0.0115 
(0.827) 
 0.0489 
(0.615) 
year & quarter 
dummies 
 
? 
 included  included  included  included 
           
No. of observations    8715  5830  8383  5512 
Pseudo R2    0.0041  0.061  0.0036  0.059 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 7  
Multivariate tests of H1 --- Separate impending credit rating upgrades from impending 
rating downgrades 
 
This table reports the logit regression results for the tests of H1, in which impending credit rating upgrades are separated from 
impending rating downgrades in the regression analyses. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The dependent variable is 
occurn, an indicator variable based on whether a firm delivers a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans during the fiscal quarter t+1. 
The treatment variables are splus, sminus, plus, and minus. splus (plus) equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating 
upgrade over the fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise. sminus (minus) equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) credit rating downgrade 
over the fiscal quarter t and 0 otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and quarter dummies are included in the 
regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in brackets are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Variables  Pred. sign  Dependent variable = occurn 
Intercept 
 
? 
 -6.3037 
         (<0.001)*** 
 -7.2945 
        (<0.001)*** 
splus        
 
+ 
 0.6561 
(0.007)*** 
  
sminus                               
 
+ 
 0.0233 
(0.934) 
  
plus 
 
+ 
   0.5759 
     (0.010)*** 
minus 
 
+ 
   0.4723 
     (0.007)*** 
entryco 
 
         + 
 0.1411 
   (0.024)** 
 0.1379 
   (0.035)** 
mktsize 
 
         - 
 -0.2588 
     (0.002)*** 
 -0.2159 
     (0.005)*** 
substi 
 
         + 
 0.5356 
(0.365) 
 0.4200 
(0.469) 
changedebt 
 
+ 
 -0.0117 
(0.538) 
 -0.0003 
(0.982) 
rd 
 
+ 
 0.0007 
(0.458) 
 0.0009 
(0.579) 
flexibility  
 
+ 
 4.1080 
         (<0.001)*** 
 4.3021 
         (<0.001)*** 
roa 
 
? 
 -2.1205 
  (0.062)* 
 -2.5868 
  (0.062)* 
sga 
 
+ 
  -0.00004 
 (0.370) 
  -0.00003 
 (0.432) 
investmentspec 
 
+ 
 0.1238 
    (0.016)** 
 0.1155 
    (0.040)** 
size                                    
 
+ 
 0.5625 
        (<0.001)*** 
 0.6323 
        (<0.001)*** 
bm 
 
- 
 0.0031 
 (0.740) 
 0.0031 
 (0.614) 
marketpower 
 
+ 
 0.4454 
(0.545) 
 0.6302 
(0.412) 
surprise 
 
+ 
 -0.0291 
 (0.681) 
 0.0053 
 (0.938) 
litigation  
 
+ 
 0.7301 
       (0.007)*** 
 0.7057 
     (0.013)** 
debt 
 
+ 
 -0.0254 
(0.408) 
 -0.0046 
(0.724) 
capitalexp 
 
+ 
 1.5700 
(0.447) 
 2.0125 
(0.335) 
earningsvol 
 
 
- 
 -0.0004 
  (0.053)* 
 -0.0004 
    (0.038)** 
Abtradvol 
 
 
+ 
  -0.0176 
        (<0.001)*** 
  -0.0177 
        (<0.001)*** 
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abret 
 
+ 
 0.0178 
     (0.031)** 
 0.0186 
     (0.019)** 
year & quarter dummies  ?    included     included 
       
No. of observations    43822  42972 
Pseudo R2    0.3213  0.3126 
Marginal effects:  
d (Prob. occurn)/d (splus or plus) 
 
+ 
 
0.0912  0.0776 
d (Prob. occurn)/d (sminus or minus)  +  0.0029  0.0625 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 8  
Multivariate tests of H1 --- Control for the lagged incidence of PBE disclosures and industry-
fixed effects 
 
This table reports the logit regression results for the tests of H1. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The dependent 
variable is occurn, which equals 1 if a firm delivers a voluntary disclosure of PBE plans over the fiscal quarter t+1 and 0 otherwise. 
The treatment variable, notchimpending (broadimpending), equals 1 if a firm is near a notch (broad) rating change during the fiscal 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. The additional control variable, lagoccurn, is an indicator variable based on whether a firm delivers a 
voluntary disclosure of PBE plans during the fiscal quarter t. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and quarter dummies 
are included in all the regressions but not reported for brevity. Industry dummies, which are included in Columns (3-4) but not 
reported for simplicity, are based on two-digit SIC codes. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm. 
  
Variables  Pred.  
sign 
                          Dependent variable = occurn  
  (1)                       (2)                     (3)                                   (4) 
Intercept 
 
? 
      -5.6022 
     (<0.001)*** 
     -5.8837    
(<0.001)*** 
     -11.0763 
     (<0.001)*** 
     -9.3042 
     (<0.001)*** 
notchimpending             
 
+ 
      0.2160 
     (0.044)** 
     0.3430    
(0.001)*** 
            
broadimpending                                     
 
+ 
        0.3365 
     (0.037)** 
     0.4957 
     (0.001)*** 
entryco 
 
+ 
      0.0732 
     (0.023)** 
     0.0740 
     (0.027)** 
     0.1657 
     (0.011)** 
     0.1589 
     (0.016)** 
mktsize 
 
- 
      -0.1287 
     (0.006)*** 
     -0.1177   
(0.012)** 
     -0.1024 
     (0.260) 
     -0.1027 
     (0.259) 
substi 
 
+ 
      0.0111 
     (0.974) 
     -0.0616 
     (0.856) 
     0.2520 
     (0.686) 
     0.1227 
     (0.846) 
changedebt 
 
+ 
      0.0027 
     (0.465) 
     0.0027 
     (0.460) 
     -0.0077 
     (0.601) 
     -0.0045 
     (0.734) 
rd 
 
+ 
      0.0003 
     (0.404) 
     0.0002 
     (0.423) 
     0.0003 
     (0.446) 
     0.0002 
     (0.601) 
flexibility  
 
+ 
      2.3672 
     (<0.001)*** 
     2.3981  
(<0.001)*** 
     3.1976 
     (<0.001)*** 
     3.2654 
     (<0.001)*** 
roa 
 
? 
      -0.6888 
     (0.061)* 
     -1.0240 
     (0.194) 
     -0.9506 
     (0.302) 
     -1.3789 
     (0.176) 
sga 
 
+ 
      1.48E-6 
     (0.975) 
    3.77E-6 
     (0.933) 
     -0.00005 
     (0.226) 
     -0.00004 
     (0.357) 
size                                    
 
+ 
      0.3103 
     (<0.001)*** 
     0.3229   
(<0.001)*** 
     0.5350 
     (<0.001)*** 
     0.5526 
     (<0.001)*** 
bm 
 
- 
      0.0044 
     (0.088)* 
     0.0028 
     (0.375) 
     0.0024 
     (0.718) 
     -0.0005 
     (0.966) 
marketpower 
 
+ 
      0.3010 
     (0.496) 
     0.3775 
     (0.398) 
     0.9819 
     (0.299) 
     1.0751 
     (0.261) 
surprise 
 
+ 
      0.0358 
     (0.602) 
     0.0544 
     (0.428) 
     -0.0667 
     (0.253) 
     -0.0337 
     (0.550) 
litigation  
 
+ 
      0.4175 
     (0.007)** 
     0.3811 
     (0.016)** 
     0.7088 
     (0.116) 
     0.6548 
     (0.171) 
debt 
 
+ 
      -0.0068 
     (0.278) 
     -0.0032 
     (0.522) 
     -0.0151 
     (0.503) 
     -0.0066 
     (0.670) 
capitalexp 
 
+ 
      1.0564 
     (0.392) 
     1.1936 
     (0.332) 
     5.6865 
     (0.001)*** 
     5.9346 
     (0.001)*** 
earningsvol  
 
- 
      -0.0003 
     (0.048)** 
 -0.0003 
     (0.056)* 
     -0.0003 
     (0.171) 
     -0.0005 
     (0.014)** 
Abtradvol 
 
? 
      -0.0081 
     (0.063)* 
     -0.0076   
(0.085)** 
     -0.0131 
     (<0.001)*** 
     -0.0131 
     (<0.001)*** 
abret 
 
? 
      0.0128 
     (0.008)*** 
     0.0132 
     (0.006)*** 
     0.0197 
     (0.008)*** 
     0.0200 
     (0.005)*** 
investmentspec 
 
+ 
      0.0744 
     (0.012)** 
     0.0809 
     (0.013)** 
     0.1157 
     (0.019)** 
     0.1227 
     (0.029)** 
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lagoccurn 
 
+ 
      5.1029 
     (<0.001)*** 
     0.1181 
     (0.040)** 
  
industry dummies  ?               included      included 
year & quarter dummies  ?       included     included      included      included 
        
No. of observations         42139      41328      41630      40796 
Pseudo R2         0.6920      0.6872      0.4247      0.4231 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 9  
Additional test: The effect of increased PBE disclosures on the likelihood of a future credit 
rating upgrade 
 
This table reports the ordered logit regression results for the tests as to the effect of increased PBE disclosures on the likelihood of 
a future credit rating upgrade. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2009. The dependent variable is Δrating, which denotes 
change in credit rating level for a firm during the fiscal quarter t+1. The rating level (rating) is transformed into conventional 
numerical scores, using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the lowest rated firms (D) to 22 for the highest rated firms (AAA). The 
treatment variable, Δfreq, equals change in the frequency of PBE disclosures during the fiscal quarter t. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix I. Year and quarter dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  
Variables 
 Pred.  
sign 
                  Dependent variable = Δrating 
  (1)                          (2)                               (3) 
Δfreq    
 
+ 
 0.0475 
  (0.038)** 
     0.0420 
    (0.075)* 
      0.0476 
     (0.036)** 
Δtasset 
 
+ 
 0.9271 
     (<0.001)*** 
     0.9278 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.9270 
    (<0.001)*** 
Δoi                                 
 
+ 
 5.9998 
   (<0.001)*** 
 6.1229 
(<0.001)*** 
 6.0032 
(<0.001)*** 
Δdebt 
 
- 
      -6.54E-7 
(0.615) 
     -6.46E-7 
(0.620) 
 -6.53E-7 
(0.019)** 
Δlev 
 
- 
      -1.8454 
     (<0.001)*** 
 -1.8509 
(<0.001)*** 
 -1.8470 
    (<0.001)*** 
car  (stock) 
 
+ 
   0.6014 
(0.007)*** 
  
car  (bond) 
 
+ 
     0.3455 
(0.069)* 
rating   
 
- 
 -0.0247 
   (<0.001)*** 
 -0.0244 
  (<0.001)*** 
 -0.0247 
    (<0.001)*** 
abtradvol 
 
? 
  -3.44E-10 
      (0.397) 
 -3.43E-10 
(0.398) 
      -3.33E-10   
     (0.412) 
abret 
 
? 
 1.4938 
       (<0.001)*** 
 1.4803 
(<0.001)*** 
      1.4909    
     (<0.001)*** 
year & quarter dummies  ?  included  included       included 
         
No. of observations    40671  40671  40671 
Pseudo R2            0.042  0.042  0.042 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
